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Abstract 
BRETT T. SMITH: Should the NCAA be Above the Law?: An Examination of the NCAA’s 
Antitrust Status 
(Under the direction of Barbara Osborne) 
 
 The National Collegiate Athletic Association has grown from a small organization 
created to police football to a multi-billion dollar organization that regulates the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of people.  Due to its huge growth, some critics wonder if the NCAA has 
spun out of control so far that it cannot save itself without government intervention.  The 
intervention that they seek is an exemption from current antitrust laws so that the NCAA could 
legally restrain out of control spending.  An exemption would provide the NCAA the freedom to 
curtail spending and potentially reform the current cost structure of major college athletics.  This 
study analyzes antitrust law and whether the NCAA would receive an antitrust exemption based 
upon precedent and other exemptions granted by Congress.  Based upon the research from this 
study, the NCAA deserves a partial exemption to regulate the member institutions, but not a total 
exemption due to parts of the NCAA being highly commercial.         
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Every year that passes, college athletics drifts further and further away from its education 
origins.  Today, major college athletics is a big-time business that is a multi-billion dollar 
industry.1  Some say that as the financial stake is increasing, institutions of higher learning are 
increasingly willing to bend the rules or look the other way to increase the bottom line.2  With so 
much money at stake, universities cannot afford to take a stand for academic integrity and 
continue to compete in major college athletics.  The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) is an association of over 1200 educational institutions that regulates collegiate 
athletics.3  The NCAA would be the most likely candidate to restore college athletics to its 
original purpose or at least restrain the rapid growth.  However, any attempt to restrain the 
growth of college athletics made by the NCAA would trigger immediate antitrust implications.  
Expecting the individual universities to scale back their athletic programs is unlikely because the 
public outcry from fans and donors could be crippling.  The NCAA is perfectly situated to 
attempt to restore college athletics if they are granted relief from antitrust laws.4
                                                          
1 Brian O’Keefe, How Florida Cashed in on College Football, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/18/news/companies 
/florida_gators.fortune/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010). 
        
 
2 Adam Schaefer, Slam Dunk: The Case for an NCAA Antitrust Exemption, 83 N.C.L. Rev. 555 (2005). 
3 Ncaa.com, NCAA Membership, http://ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/ 
About%20The%20NCAA/Membership/membership_breakdown.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).  
 
4 Schaefer, supra note 2, at 564. 
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One critic has gone so far as to say that public interest and common sense require an 
antitrust exemption for the NCAA to effectively regulate college athletics.5  The NCAA has the 
responsibility of maintaining the tradition of amateurism in college sports.  Because of this large 
responsibility, the NCAA needs tremendous flexibility to fulfill this obligation.  However, the 
current antitrust laws do not grant the flexibility that is needed to exist and does not allow the 
NCAA to effectively deal with the serious issues it faces.  This ineffectiveness should show 
Congress that a special exemption should be granted to the NCAA so that it can effectively serve 
its members.6
While this argument makes sense, others argue that removing antitrust restraints would 
harm college athletics.  Roberts argues that immunizing big-time intercollegiate athletics from 
the constraints of antitrust law will allow athletic programs to profit by the uncontrolled 
exploitation of student-athletes and consumers.
   
7  He believes that such an exemption will do 
violence to the values of competition and consumer welfare because the NCAA is such a 
commercially driven enterprise and an exemption will allow too much free reign.8  Lazaroff 
believes that student-athletes are already being exploited while the NCAA is restricted by 
antitrust laws.  Major college football and basketball players generate considerable revenue for 
schools and athletic conferences.9
                                                          
5 Id. at 567. 
  Courts failing to recognize that there is a market for the 
student-athletes’ services arguably results in an unjustifiable restraint on competition and an 
6 Id. at 568 
7 Gary Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2674 (1996). 
8 Id.  
9 Daniel Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antirust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 
329,  371 (2007). 
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illegal wealth transfer from student-athletes to their schools in his mind.10  This wealth transfer 
and restraint economically injures the student-athletes as sellers of sports talent and as consumers 
of higher education.11
 
  
Statement of Purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to examine case law, statutes, congressional records, and 
legal journals to determine whether the NCAA should be granted an exemption from antitrust 
laws.   
      
Definitions 
Antitrust Law: The body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints,  
monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination.  The principal federal antitrust laws 
are the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.12
Bowl Alliance:  An arrangement between the ACC, Big East, Big 12, and SEC that attempted to  
 
match the top two teams against each other in a bowl game.  None of the participating 
conference champions were committed to play in any bowl game as they had been in the 
past under the conference bowl affiliation arrangements.    The arrangement lasted for 
three years and was replaced by the Bowl Championship Series.13
Bowl Championship Series: The Bowl Championship Series (BCS) is a five-game showcase of  
 
                                                          
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
 
13 Pasadena Tournament of Roses, BCS Bowl History, http://www.tournamentofroses.com/bcs/bcs-history.asp (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2010). 
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college football.  The five bowl games are the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, the FedEx Orange 
Bowl, the Rose Bowl Game presented by Citi, the Allstate Sugar Bowl and the BCS 
National Championship Game that is played at one of the bowl sites.  The BCS is not an 
entity. Instead, it is an event managed by the 11 NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision 
conferences -- all of them "BCS Conferences" -- and the University of Notre Dame.14
Clayton Act: Deals with specific types of restraints including exclusive dealing arrangements,  
 
tie-in sales, price discrimination, mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking directorates, 
carries only civil penalties and is enforced jointly by both the Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission.15
Primary Source: Publications which contain the original decisions and actions of legislative,  
 
judicial, and administrative bodies such as cases, statutes, or regulatory decisions.16
Secondary Sources: sources containing excerpts, reprints and discussions such as law review or  
 
legal journal articles, legal encyclopedias, or legal treatises.   
Sherman Act of 1890: Prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,  
and monopolization, includes criminal penalties when enforced by the government. 
Violation can result in substantial fines and, for individual transgressors, prison terms. In 
addition, court orders restraining future violations are also available. These provisions are 
enforced primarily by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.17
 
 
                                                          
14 Bowl Championship Series, BCS Background, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809699 (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2010). 
 
15 Richard Steuer, Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/241454.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
 
16 Humboldt State University Library, http://library.humboldt.edu/infoservices/primary.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2010). 
 
17 Id.  
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Research Questions 
1) What factors should the court consider in examining the antitrust status of the NCAA? 
2) Under current United States antitrust law, does the NCAA deserve to be granted an 
exemption? 
 
Significance 
 This study is important because the NCAA needs the ability to restrain the current growth 
of college athletics before college athletics in its current form ceases to exist.  However, almost 
any attempt by the NCAA to slow the growth would be met with immediate scrutiny under 
antitrust laws.  If the NCAA were granted an exemption from such laws, they would then be able 
to legally restrain the current growth and potentially guide college athletics back to its original 
educational mission.  This also comes at an important time as the current presidential 
administration may examine the legality of the Bowl Championship Series.18  The Justice 
Department issued a letter to Senator Orrin Hatch that outlined the inequities of the BCS system 
and that it is considering investigating the BCS under antitrust laws.19
 
  Such an investigation 
could provide insight into the NCAA’s antitrust status and change the college football postseason 
format drastically.      
                                                          
18 Darren Everson, U.S. May Examine College Football Bowl System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704491604575035493947416852.html.  
 
19 Id.  
  
 
Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
 This chapter will examine the relevant literature involving the intersection of the NCAA, 
antitrust, and sports.  It will begin with a general overview of the NCAA and legal issues that it 
has faced with antitrust challenges in the past.  Next, a discussion of specific challenges that raise 
antitrust questions such as student-athletes’ transfer rules, recruitment guidelines, and the college 
football bowl system.  Then, there will be a brief discussion of the researchers that have asked 
for Congress to become involved with the NCAA antitrust situation to help rectify the situation.  
After discussing the amateur issues involving antitrust, literature focusing on professional sports 
will be discussed to determine if any parallels can be drawn between amateur and professional 
issues.  Finally, the labor antitrust exemption will be discussed as it is a legislative and judicial 
exemption from antitrust laws.     
 
NCAA General Overview 
The NCAA has become a very popular target for criticism because some Division I athletic 
departments now resemble medium-sized corporations, earning multi-million dollar profits each 
year.20  Critics argue that intercollegiate athletics is an extremely profitable commercial 
enterprise based on the blood, sweat, and tears of student-athletes.21
                                                          
20 Christian Dennie, White out Full Grant in Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 97 (2007). 
   Others have said college 
 
21 Id. at 124. 
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sports are auxiliary businesses, with many administrative decisions being made primarily or 
exclusively for commercial motives.  On the other hand, many of the student-athletes perceive 
college merely as a minor league training ground for professional leagues rather than an 
opportunity to gain an education.22  Some believe that juries would find that these sports are 
administered at most Division I institutions far more with an eye on their commercial 
performance than on their educational value.23  However, while the NCAA’s Division I members 
have operations that may be primarily driven by commercial motives, they are still strongly 
influenced by educational values that are often at odds with the Sherman Act’s value of 
promoting competition in the marketplace.24
Due to the NCAA’s unique status in athletics and commerce, it is often criticized for its 
special treatment.  The NCAA is a non-profit organization, but the NCAA and related nonprofit 
organizations indeed possess a commercial aspect.
 
25  Wallace thinks it should not be taken as an 
attack upon the amateurism of intercollegiate athletics for one to acknowledge that there is a 
business aspect in the providing of coaching for the athletes or in the providing of athletic events 
to an interested public.26  In 2002, in conjunction with a panel of Harvard University economists, 
Business Week magazine named the NCAA “The Best Little Monopoly in America.”27
                                                          
22 Roberts, supra note 7, at 2673. 
 To 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 K. Todd Wallace, Elite Domination of College Football: An Analysis of the Antitrust Implications of the Bowl 
Alliance, 6 Sports Law. J., Spring 1999 at 57, 69.  
 
26 Id. 
27 Bradley Pensyl, Whistling a Foul on the NCAA: How NCAA Recruiting Bylaws Violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, 58 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 397, 398 (2008). 
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achieve this dubious distinction, the NCAA beat out, among others, Microsoft, the U.S. Postal 
Service and OPEC.28
 
 
NCAA Antitrust 
The NCAA is not exempt from antitrust laws, but it has had two considerations working 
in its favor.  First, sports in the United States have historically been given a great deal of leeway 
in terms of their treatment under antitrust laws.29  Second, the NCAA is strongly linked to higher 
education and traditions of amateurism.30  Due to this current acceptance by the courts, college 
amateurism remains a legal lightning rod that could destroy the idea of big time athletics tied to 
an institution of higher education and leave only a pure minor league system to professional 
sports.31
The NCAA is no stranger to antitrust litigation: the Association and member institutions 
have dug a deep hole promulgating legislation solely to reduce costs.
  
32 It has been noted that cost 
reduction by the NCAA is not a legally sufficient justification for an agreement to fix prices and 
save inefficient or unsuccessful competitors from failure.33
                                                          
28 Id. 
  The NCAA has had mixed results 
when cases have actually made it to court.  Dennie says the NCAA has been handedly defeated 
29 Fleisher et al., The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior, University of Chicago 
Press 1992).  
 
30 Id. 
31 Kristin Muenzen, Weakening it’s Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257,  
258 (2003). 
 
32 Dennie, supra note 20, at 125. 
33 Id. 
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in hotly contested litigation, which gives antitrust plaintiffs a window for success.34 The same 
author immediately follows that claim by saying that most courts give deference to NCAA 
rules.35  The NCAA was found in violation of antitrust laws in three cases and they have 
provided a framework in which to defeat NCAA rules and regulations.36  Courts have struck 
down NCAA regulations and policies pertaining to a restricted college football television plan37, 
restricted coaches’ earnings38, and restricted participation in post-season men’s basketball 
tournaments.39  Additionally, the NCAA has been forced to defend antitrust challenges to rules 
governing the equipment that may be used in NCAA football40, baseball41 and lacrosse games42 
and the number of games that basketball teams may play in a season.43
In a symposium on antitrust and amateur sports, a summary of the problem in courts’ 
handling of antitrust challenges was presented.  In recent years, courts have begun to address the 
question of how to apply the antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations and other entities which, 
although they operate in the commercial marketplace, assert noneconomic justifications for their 
 
                                                          
34 Id. at 110. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
38 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
39 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
40 Aculeus 5, LLC v. NFL Properties, LLC, No. CV 04-4252 GAF (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2005). 
41 Baum Research and Development Co., Inc v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
42 Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, No. 08-14812, 2009 WL 646633 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2009). 
43 Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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behavior.44  This question is becoming increasingly important to the NCAA and similar amateur 
sports organizations.  Such groups frequently engage in activities which, if engaged in by most 
commercial competitors, could be deemed illegal per se.45  In most circumstances, it just does 
not make sense to treat amateur sports organizations like commercial, profit-making 
enterprises.46  The organizations themselves are nonprofit, and have legitimate noncommercial 
goals.47  A court faced with the question of how to apply the antitrust laws to the activities of 
amateur sports organizations can take one of three approaches: (1) that noneconomic or 
“noncommercial” factors are not relevant at all; (2) that they justify a total exemption from the 
antitrust laws; or (3) that they justify application of the rule of reason in cases which would 
otherwise be subject to a per se test of illegality.48  In addition, if the court applies the rule of 
reason, it must determine what, if any, weight to give to noneconomic factors.49  Although it was 
generally assumed prior to 1970 that noncommercial activities were entitled to a total exemption 
from the antitrust laws, cases decided since then clearly show that the existence of 
noncommercial goals will not totally shield the NCAA or any other amateur sports organizations 
from antitrust liability.50  The relevant question, therefore, is to what extent, if any, courts will 
take noneconomic factors into account in applying the per se rule or the rule of reason.51
                                                          
44 Wendy Kirby and T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Noneconomic Values, 61 In. L.J. 
31 (1985). 
 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 32. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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Recruiting Rules 
Not only has the NCAA seen general challenges to its regulations and antitrust status, 
some have begun to point out specific issues that are affected by antitrust law.  Pensyl argues that 
the NCAA has evolved into a highly commercialized entity that enacts regulations designed to 
promote its financial interests in the billion-dollar industry of college athletics.52  He continues 
by stating the NCAA enacts many of these policies with little regard for the well-being and 
education pursuits of its student-athletes. 53 Further, he believes that the last thing the NCAA 
should be granted is an exemption from antitrust laws because the rules created by the NCAA are 
not promoting education and amateurism.54  Instead, the NCAA recruiting regulations should be 
subject to the same level of antitrust scrutiny that courts apply to the conduct of any other major 
commercial entity.55
 
 
College Football Bowl System 
Prior to the Bowl Championship Series being formed, the Bowl Alliance was created to 
enhance the opportunity to provide a national championship game each year in Division I-A 
football.56
                                                                                                                                                                                           
51 Id. 
  The Bowl Alliance was never tried in a court of law as being in violation of the 
federal antitrust laws, so it is unclear how a court would have decided the complex issue.  What 
is clear is that the Alliance’s arrangement produced several anticompetitive effects on college 
52 Pensyl, supra note 27, at 425. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 426. 
55 Id. 
56 Fiesta Bowl, BCS History, http://www.fiestabowl.org/index.php/about/BCS_history/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
12 
 
football and its fans.57  While the Alliance offered the benefit of giving consumers a National 
Championship game, this benefit did not appear to be sufficient to justify an arrangement which 
reduced the output and product of college football.58  All the while, elite universities reaped the 
millions of dollars from the monopoly prices required by the Alliance.59  The detractors of the 
system believed that the procompetitive effect of producing a National Championship game 
would not have been sufficient to negate the anticompetitive impact on the product of college 
football. 60
Professor Roberts identified four possible challengers to the Alliance arrangement that 
could bring about change in the system.  While these proposed challengers were referenced to 
the Bowl Alliance, they likely would be the same challengers to the current Bowl Championship 
Series.  The potential challengers would be as follows: (1) the four Alliance bowls which are 
being forced to make monopoly payments, (2) media outlets, which are also being charged a 
monopoly fee in obtaining the media rights, (3) the excluded bowls, and/or (4) one or more of 
the excluded Division I-A schools who do not possess the equal access that other Alliance 
institutions maintain.
 
61  However, Professor Roberts believes that none of these entitles would 
choose to engage in such an expensive, time-consuming, and politically dangerous legal battle 
with the power and influence of the multimillion dollar Alliance.62
                                                          
57 Wallace, supra note 25, at 82. 
  While he believes that the 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 85. 
62 Id. 
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legal authority appears to rest with any challenger of this plan, reality dictates that such a 
challenge, and thus the results, will not become clear for quite some time.63
College football has moved on from the Bowl Alliance to the Bowl Championship Series.  
The structure is similar to the Bowl Alliance and potential antitrust challengers still exists.  Non-
BCS universities have increasingly cried foul and are ready to challenge the BCS arrangement 
with an antitrust lawsuit.
  
64 These universities contend that the BCS fails to provide all Division 
I-A programs with equal access to postseason opportunities, resulting in a system that stifles 
competition and runs contrary to federal antitrust law.65  The BCS conferences argue that the 
system does not violate the Sherman Act but rewards those universities with the winningest 
traditions in college football.66  In analyzing the BCS under current antitrust law, at least one 
commentator thinks filing an antitrust challenge is the wrong decision.67  Another examination of 
the BCS and antitrust laws came to the same conclusion.68
 
  They determined that a rule of reason 
analysis of the BCS would likely result in the conclusion that the pro-competitive features of the 
BCS outweigh any alleged anti-competitive effects.   
 
 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Jodi Warmbrod, Antitrust and Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long: Why Non-BCS Universities Should Punt Rather 
Than Go For an Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Championship Series, 57 OKLA L. REV. 333, 334 (2004). 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 335. 
67 Id. at 379. 
68 Brett Fanasci, An Antitrust Analysis of College Football’s Bowl Championship Series, 50 LOY. L. REV. 967,  996 
(2004). 
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Transfer Restrictions 
One of the more direct applications of antitrust law is the limitation upon transferring 
between schools by student-athletes.  As with most other challengers, Konsky believes that 
today’s NCAA is a far cry from the organization’s humble beginnings and rhetorical focus on 
standards of academics and amateurism.69  She also argues that as the NCAA becomes 
increasingly commercialized, its rules and regulations should come under the same scrutiny as 
those of other commercial organizations.70  Konsky concludes that NCAA transfer rules are 
anticompetitive commercial restraints without significant procompetitive benefits.71  Further, the 
transfer rules minimal procompetitive benefits could be accomplished by less restrictive means.72  
She argues that instead of restricting all athletes with few exceptions, that transfers could only be 
restricted when a move was athletically motivated and not based upon academic criteria.73 Given 
these effects, Konsky believes the current transfer rules implement a plainly illegal restraint on 
trade in violation of the Sherman Act.74  While the article makes an interesting argument, courts 
have heard the issue of transfer rules within the NCAA.  In Weiss v. Eastern College Athletic 
Conference, the court would not issue an injunction against the NCAA because the plaintiff only 
offered speculative evidence of irreparable harm.75
                                                          
69 Sarah Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1607 (2003). 
  It should be noted that this case was decided 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1606. 
74 Id. at 1607. 
75 Weiss v. Eastern College Athletic Conference, 563 F. Supp. 192 (ED Penn 1983). 
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before Board of Regents and the Court in Weiss was unclear as to the applicability of the antitrust 
laws to athletic conferences.76
A more recent case, Tanaka v. University of Southern California, also did not find that 
amateur transfer rules are violations of antitrust laws.
    
77  In Tanaka, a soccer player transferred 
from University of Southern California to University of California, Los Angeles, both schools 
within the Pacific 10 conference.78  A conference rule restricted intra-conference transfers and 
stated that the student-athlete must sit out two academic years.79  In deciding the case, the court 
declined to determine whether the rule was sufficiently commercial to be decided under antitrust 
laws.80  For argument sake, the court analyzed the issued under antitrust laws and found that 
even in the women’s soccer market in Los Angeles, the rule did not have an anticompetitive 
effect on the market.81  Additionally, there could be no harm to the national market because it 
only affected schools in the Pacific 10 conference.82
 
   
Congressional Involvement 
While there are potential challengers in court, some believe that Congress should create a 
legal structure that best balances the values of both the academy and the free commercial 
                                                          
76 Konsky, supra note 69, at 1592. 
77 Tanaka v. University of Southern California, 252 F. 3d 1059 (9th Cir 2001). 
78 Id. at 1061. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1062. 
81 Id. at 1064. 
82 Id. at 1065. 
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marketplace, but the chances of legislative intervention are very remote.83  Others think that 
Congress may be the last resort for hope for NCAA reforms.84   The major problem with 
congressional intervention may be the political cross-currents that so often accompany the 
legislative process suggest the viability of this alternative might be criticized severely.85  While 
an actual legislative intervention may not be realistic, Congress could help by conducting 
hearings or merely threatening legislative action.86  One possible legislative solution would be 
for Congress to create an antitrust exemption for the NCAA.  A solution offered is an antitrust 
exemption that could be limited to amateurism regulations, or it could be more extensive by 
treating the NCAA as a single economic entity and thereby removing much of its rulemaking 
from Section 1 of the Sherman Act.87  Lazaroff believes that this solution would satisfy the 
NCAA and perhaps some of its membership.  However, he argues that this action would 
perpetuate the inequities that run rampant in the current system and make legal significantly 
anticompetitive conduct.88  He believes that any easing of the burden on the judicial system 
could be outweighed by the negative impact of allowing the NCAA to continue to engage in an 
unsupervised distortion of market forces.89
 
  
 
                                                          
83 Roberts, supra note 7, at 2674 
84 Lazaroff, supra note 9, at 369. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 370. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
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Professional Sports 
Amateur sports have seen some antitrust challenges recently, but professional sports have 
been dealing with antitrust issues for much longer.  Professional team sports have unique 
characteristics which distinguish them from most other business enterprises.90  In most industries 
and professions, each firm's success comes at the expense of other firms and firms are usually 
delighted when a competitor goes out of business.91 The professional sport model is set up much 
different than the regular business environment. The success of each franchise depends on the 
success of other franchises since they jointly produce a product which one of them cannot 
produce alone.92 In order to prosper and survive, therefore, members of professional sports 
leagues must work together to maintain a competitive balance between franchises and to ensure 
financial stability.93
Section 1 of the Sherman Act focuses on restraints of trade imposed by combination, 
contract, or conspiracy and on joint activity.
   
94  In other words, restraints of trade created by a 
single actor are immune from coverage under Section 1.95 Therefore, if the member teams of a 
professional sports league are regarded as a single entity for antitrust purposes, none of their joint 
decisions can be attacked under Section 1, since the requisite plurality of actors will be absent.96
                                                          
90 Scott Foraker, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 159 
(1985). 
 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Michael Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 
67 IND. L.J. 25, 26 (1992). 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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If, on the other hand, the member teams are viewed as separate entities, then their collective 
actions are properly subject to Section 1 scrutiny.97  This single entity debate is at the heart of a 
Supreme Court case involving the NFL.98  The NCAA filed an amicus curie brief in the case and 
stated that “by affirming the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, and holding that sports leagues act as 
single entities when they promulgate or enforce league rules or engage in other league activities 
that do not eliminate actual or potential economic competition between league members, this 
Court will enable all sports leagues, including the NCAA, to go about their welfare-enhancing 
daily operations without self-imposed timidity over baseless antitrust litigation, will enhance the 
efficiency of the litigation that is filed, and will allow for early determinations that will minimize 
waste of both party and judicial resources.”99
 
 
National Football League. The case being heard by the Supreme Court is American Needle, Inc.  
v. National Football League.100  The legal doctrine at the center of the case is known as single 
entity theory.  If the NFL manages to persuade the Supreme Court that the league is a single 
entity competing with other providers of entertainment rather than a group of 32 separate 
businesses competing with each other, the landscape of the sports industry will be 
transformed.101
                                                          
97 Id. 
  If it is a single unit and not 32 separate, competing teams, any violation of 
98 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008). 
99 Brief for National Collegiate Athletic Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, American Needle, 
Inc. v. National Football League, No. 08-661 (Nov. 24, 1990).   
 
100 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 735.  
101 Lester Munson, Antitrust Case Could be Armageddon, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story? 
columnist=munson_lester&id=4336261 (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
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antitrust law would be impossible to establish.102  A violation of the Sherman Act begins with a 
combination, contract or conspiracy that restrains competition and hurts consumers.103  If the 
NFL is a single unit, it cannot be in combination, contract or conspiracy. It would be immune to 
the antitrust cases that have allowed player unions to establish and to protect free agency and 
other benefits.104  Under the rule of single entity suggested by the NFL, the league could be 
vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny only if it were to join with other leagues or other providers of 
entertainment in setting prices, a highly unlikely development.105   If the NFL is successful, then 
players, maverick owners, networks, paraphernalia manufacturers, fans and others will find 
themselves conducting business with what would be one of the most powerful cartels ever.106  If 
the NFL is determined to be a single entity, McCann thinks it will not affect the NCAA much 
because it is structurally different from professional sports and is already the recipient of an 
adverse court ruling in Board of Regents.107
The NFL may be in a very important antitrust case currently, but one author believes the 
outcome of the case does not matter.  Heintel believes antitrust law is not applicable to the 
unique circumstances of the NFL.
   
108
                                                          
102 Id. 
  He concluded that the League (NFL) is a natural monopoly 
under existing legal and economic principles and it achieved its position through the ability and 
103 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1890). 
104 Munson, supra note 101.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Michael McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity To Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 101, 151 (2009). 
 
108 Robert Heintel, The Need for an Alternative to Antitrust Regulation for the National Football League, 46 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1996). 
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intelligence of its management. 109  If the NFL is a natural monopoly, its status as a monopoly is 
not a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.110  The only way the NFL could be liable under 
the Sherman Act is if it engaged in activity intended to unlawfully prevent another firm from 
trying to compete for the NFL’s natural monopoly.111
 
 
Major League Baseball.  Baseball has long been exempt from antitrust laws because of an early 
decision and two subsequent challenges that have been denied.  In Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs112,  the Supreme Court held 
that professional baseball was exempt from antitrust laws because baseball games were not 
interstate commerce.  The Court found that giving exhibitions of baseball is a business of purely 
state affairs and the fact that people may cross state lines is “merely incident, not the essential 
thing” of the business.113   The Court subsequently affirmed Federal Baseball Club in Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, Inc.114 In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., the Court noted that if there are 
evils which warrant antitrust laws to be applied to baseball, it is Congress’ responsibility to 
impose them.115 Most recently, Flood v. Kuhn116
                                                          
109 Id. at 1055. 
  adhered to earlier decisions that baseball is not 
110 Id. at 1060. 
111 Id. 
112 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
113 Joshua Hamilton, Congress in Relief: The Economic Importance of Revoking Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 38 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1998). 
 
114 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
115 Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1230. 
116 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
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subject to federal antitrust laws.  Courts have repeatedly cited Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore as the authority in cases attacking baseball on antitrust grounds.117
In Piazza v. Major League Baseball, the court’s interpretation of Flood effectively 
removed the rule of stare decisis of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and Toolson by 
declaring that baseball is interstate commerce.
   
118  The court also determined that the Supreme 
Court established a new rule that the exemption applies only to the reserve clause.119 Baseball’s 
exemption has allowed the owners to combine forces and restrict the free movement of existing 
major league franchises.120  All other sports are governed by the rule of reason analysis regarding 
efforts to restrict franchise movement.121  Despite over eighty years of Congressional inaction 
since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Hamilton thinks there 
is good reason to believe that Congress is poised to remove the exemption.122
  
 
Labor Exemption 
One other area that has been successful in being granted an antitrust exemption is in labor 
unions.  In order to encourage the formation of labor unions for collective bargaining, Congress 
agreed that labor organizations are not to be considered combinations that restrain trade under 
the antitrust laws.123
                                                          
117 Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1229 
  Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that the antitrust laws do not forbid 
118 Piaza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
119 Id. 
120 Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1247 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1251. 
123 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§  6, 17 (1982). 
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the existence and operation of labor organizations and that these organizations and their 
members shall not "be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of 
trade, under the antitrust laws."124   Because of this special treatment of labor unions, Congress 
has created an antitrust exemption.  In addition to the statutory exemption, the court system has 
agreed with Congress and created a judicial exemption.  This non-statutory exemption was 
designed by the Supreme Court to promote collective bargaining under the National Labor 
Relations Act, and exempts certain union-employer agreements which are the products of 
collective bargaining.125
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 Foraker, supra note 90, at 162. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 Legal research begins with understanding the topic that you are attempting to research or 
framing the issues.  The goal of this step in the process is to learn the language and key terms, 
basic statutes and cases, and identify the issues.126
                                                          
126 Harvard Law School Research Methodology, http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/research/guides/ 
united_states/research-methodology.html (last visited March 1, 2010). 
  One of the easiest ways to begin legal 
research is by reading law reviews, journal articles and other secondary sources.  This activity 
will help one learn the language of the issue, identify primary sources, and provide an overview 
of the research that has already been completed in this area.  LexisNexis, Westlaw and other 
similar legal databases are a great resource for finding law review articles.  Legal encyclopedias 
also offer a broad overview of legal subjects to help researchers begin to understand the field.  
American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum are the two main legal encyclopedias used 
in legal research.  The research for this project was completed using LexisNexis Academic that 
was available through the University of North Carolina online library system.  The initial step in 
the research was to understand the intersection of antitrust law and the NCAA.  Therefore, the 
first search conducted was in the law review database using the keywords of “NCAA & 
antitrust.”  This resulted in over 1100 articles.  The search was refined using only results from 
the Marquette Sports Law Review and the Sports Lawyers Journal to limit the results to articles 
relating to sport.  This limited the results to a more manageable 86 articles.  This core of articles 
served as the path to understanding the basics of antitrust and its application to the NCAA.  
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 In the process of reading the core group of articles, the next step in the research became 
clearer.  Not only did the core articles provide insight into other articles that would be of 
assistance, but they helped determine the case law and legislation that needed to be examined.  
Before moving on to primary sources, it was important to evaluate the current research in the 
field.  This involved determining what questions have already been answered, legal theories that 
needed to be modified, and the crucial facts for determining the issues.127
Once the cases are read and the law verified, the cases will be synthesized to provide the 
standard of review for an antitrust analysis.  This action is completed by taking the many 
standards and tests established through the cases and combining them into one, comprehensive 
framework for analyzing the antitrust status of the NCAA.  This process will answer the first 
research question that examines what factors should be considered in making an antitrust ruling 
on college sport.  After it has been determined what factors are to be used in making the 
decision, the specific facts relating to the NCAA can be applied to determine whether the NCAA 
deserves an exemption from antitrust laws to answer the second research question.       
  After evaluating the 
preliminary research, case law and statutes must be read to attempt to understand the logic 
behind decisions that have been made.  The main cases were cited to in multiple journal articles 
making it easy to find the specific cases instead of trying multiple keyword searches in legal 
databases.  Cases and legislation will be located using LexisNexis Academic and the law library 
at the University of North Carolina.  After the cases and legislation are located and before the 
final analysis is made, it is critical to review the validity of the sources.  This process can be 
completed using a citation service such as Sheppard’s or through updates provided for casebooks 
and legislative updates.     
                                                          
127 Id. 
  
 
Chapter 4 
Research 
 The overall purpose of this study was to determine whether the NCAA should be granted 
an exemption from antitrust laws.  This chapter will serve as the framework for making that 
decision.  Legal research was conducted using law reviews, journals, case law, statutes and other 
research materials to put together an outline for analyzing the NCAA using current antitrust law.  
The relevant laws will be discussed in this chapter and the structure for examining the NCAA 
antitrust status in the final chapter will be presented. 
 Antitrust laws have twin goals of preventing collusion between competitors and 
preventing monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures.128  Section 1 of the Act deals with 
the prevention of collusion between competitors and Section 2 outlines the prevention of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures.  Section 1 has been the primary focus of 
antitrust challenges related to the NCAA.129  One author originally believed that Section 2 did 
not apply to the NCAA because it is an unincorporated association of independent 
universities130
                                                          
128 Ray Yasser, et al., Sports Law: Cases and Materials 181 (5th ed. 2003). 
, but that assumption was proven wrong.  In In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football 
Players Litigation, the Court found enough facts for a Section 2 claim to escape a judgment on 
 
129 E.g., Tanaka, supra note 77; Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D.Az., 1983). 
 
130 Schaefer, supra note 2, at 556. 
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the pleadings.131
    
  Due to this finding, Section 2 will be discussed briefly, but most of this 
Chapter will focus on Section 1. 
Sherman Act History and Interpretation 
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision, or of crystal 
clarity, and the Act itself did not define them.132  In consequence of the vagueness of its 
language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content to the statute. It is 
appropriate that courts should interpret the language of the statute in the light of its legislative 
history and of the particular evils at which the legislation was aimed.133  The Sherman Act was 
enacted in the era of “trusts” and “combinations” of businesses and of capital organized and 
directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and 
services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern.134  The 
objective sought was the prevention of restraints of free competition in business and commercial 
transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to 
the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be 
regarded as a special form of public injury.135
                                                          
131 In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (W.D. Wash., 2005). 
  The history of the Sherman Act as contained in 
the legislative proceedings is emphatic in its support for the conclusion that business competition 
was the problem considered and that the act was designed to prevent restraint of trade which had 
132 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al., 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 493. 
135 Id. 
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a significant effect on such competition.136  However, the antitrust laws have their limits; they 
are not all-encompassing statutes that regulate every facet of human conduct.  In a case involving 
unsavory business practices, the court noted that the Sherman Act may not be extended beyond 
its intended scope and used to police the morals of the marketplace.137 Finally, it should be noted 
that the Sherman Act protects competition, not competitors.138
 
    
Non-Profit Associations Applicability 
One of the first challenges that plaintiffs faced in attacking the antitrust status of the NCAA 
was establishing that the rules even applied to them because of their non-profit status.  It is 
axiomatic that Section One of the Sherman Act regulates only transactions that are commercial 
in nature.139  Congress, however, intended this statute to embrace the widest array of conduct 
possible.140   Section One’s scope thus reaches the activities of nonprofit organizations, including 
institutions of higher learning.141  Nonprofit organizations are not beyond the purview of the 
Sherman Act, because the absence of profit is no guarantee that an entity will act in the best 
interest of consumers.142
                                                          
136 Id. 
   
137 Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 1978). 
138 Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir. 1989). 
139 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., et al., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
140 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-7 (1975). 
141 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
142 U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir 1990).   
28 
 
While it is settled that good motives themselves will not validate an otherwise 
anticompetitive practice143, courts often look at a party’s intent to help it judge the likely effects 
of challenged conduct.144  Thus, when bona fide, non-profit professional associations adopt a 
restraint which they claim is motivated by public service or ethical norms, economic harm to 
consumers may be viewed as less predictable and certain.145  In such circumstances, it is proper 
to entertain and weigh procompetitive justifications proffered in defense of an alleged restraint 
before declaring it to be unreasonable.146  Although nonprofit organizations are not entitled to a 
class exemption from the Sherman Act, when they perform acts that are the antithesis of 
commercial activity, they are immune from antitrust regulation.147  This immunity, however, is 
narrowly circumscribed.  It does not extend to commercial transactions with a public-service 
aspect.148  In Goldfarb, the court was examining whether learned professions, such as being a 
lawyer, were exempt from Section One of the Sherman Act.  The court could not find support for 
this notion, even if the professional practice involved a public-service aspect.  Congress intended 
to strike as broadly as it could in Section One, and to read into it so wide an exemption as the 
plaintiffs urged on the court would be at odds with Congress’ purpose.149
                                                          
143 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at n.23.  
    
144 U.S. v. Brown, 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
145 Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Medical Society, 457 US 332, 343 (1982). 
146 Brown, 5 F.3d at 672. 
147 Id. 
148 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787. 
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Courts classify a transaction as commercial or noncommercial based on the nature of the 
conduct in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances.150 In Brown, the court stated that 
the exchange of money for services, even by a nonprofit organization, is a quintessential 
commercial transaction.151  The exchange of a service for money is commerce in the most 
common usage of that word.152  Therefore, the payment of tuition in return for services 
constitutes commerce.153
 
   
Section One Claim 
In order to establish a claim under Section One, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that there 
was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade 
under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint 
affected interstate commerce.154  The key to finding an antitrust violation is in measuring the 
impact upon competition in a definable market.155  The failure to allege injury to competition is a 
proper ground for dismissal by judgment on the pleadings.156
 
   
                                                          
150 Brown, 5 F.3d at 666. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 See Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). 
155 McGlinch v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 812-13 (9th Cir 1988). 
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Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy.  The first element of a Section One violation is that it 
involves some kind of concerted action with another person or company.157  These actions are 
“combinations, contracts or conspiracies” in restraint of trade prohibited by Section One of the 
Sherman Act.  To allege a combination, contract or conspiracy, the compliant must identify co-
conspirators, and describe the nature and effects of the alleged conspiracy.158  The plaintiff’s 
burden of proving concerted action will not be satisfied by insubstantial evidence or unsupported 
speculations.159  The fact that defendants did not have identical motives, or that one party to the 
agreement was coerced into participation does not absolve the defendants of liability.160
 There are three types of agreements to consider when looking for a contract, combination 
or conspiracy: express agreements, agreements inferred from conduct, and agreements within a 
single entity.  An express agreement can manifest itself in the form of a written contract, a 
handshake agreement, or a call to action followed by the action called for.
   
161  Giving an 
agreement an innocent name, like “joint venture agreement” will not immunize it from violating 
antitrust laws.162  To infer a contract, combination, or conspiracy, the inference of concerted 
action must be more probable from the evidence than the inference of independent action.163
                                                          
157 Richard Yurko and Nicole King, Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Horizontal Restraints of Trade and 
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other words, the court will look to the defendant’s motive to join a conspiracy and whether 
defendant’s conduct was consistent with independent interest.164  To prove an agreement, a 
plaintiff must show, at a minimum, conscious parallel conduct combined with other “plus” 
factors.165  The “plus” factors can include self-interest only served by similar conduct166, 
artificial standardization of products167, raising of prices during surplus168, or extensive 
communications or opportunity for collusion.169  Finally, as discussed above, there must be a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more actors.  However, the Supreme Court 
has held that activities of a parent corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary are deemed to be 
within a single entity and therefore do not involve the real multiplicity of actors required by 
Section One.170
 
    
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade.  Section One of the Sherman Act provides that every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states is declared to be illegal.171  Courts long ago realized that the 
literal application of the Section would render virtually every business arrangement unlawful.172
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165 See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. or Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.173  To bind, to restrain, is 
of their very essence.174  Because even beneficial business contracts or combinations restrain 
trade to some degree, Section One has been interpreted to prohibit only those contracts or 
combinations that are unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.175 The Supreme Court 
has defined trade or commerce to be commercial competition in the marketing of goods or 
services.176  In that light, the aim of the statute was to free competition in business and 
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the 
market to the detriment of purchases or consumers of goods and services.177
 
  
Standards of Review 
Per Se.  Three general standards have emerged for determining whether a business combination 
unreasonably restrains trade under Section One: Per Se, Quick Look, and Rule of Reason.  There 
are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.178  Such plainly 
anticompetitive agreements or practices are deemed to be illegal per se.179  Business certainty 
and litigation efficiency are the principal salutary effects of per se rules.180
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  Such rules tend to 
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175 Standard Oil Co. v U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
176 Apex, 310 U.S. at 493.  
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provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the 
judicial system of the more complex rule of reason trials.181
Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law 
under an illegal per se approach because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is 
so high; a per se rule is applied when the “practice facially appears to be one that would always 
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”
   
182  In such circumstances, a 
restraint is presumed unreasonable without inquiry into the particular market context in which it 
is found.183  Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of 
anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged 
conduct.184  But whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market 
analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same – whether or not the challenged restraint 
enhances competition.185  Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in judging the validity 
of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition.186
The per se rule is applicable when the exclusionary or coercive conduct is a direct affront 
to competition, or naked restraint, rather than action that merely has an incidental effect on 
competition.
  
187
                                                          
181 Continental TV, 433 U.S. at n.16. 
  However, certain products require horizontal restraints, including agreements in 
182 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).   
183 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See Justice v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
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which horizontal price fixing restraints are necessary for the product to exist.188  Since Goldfarb, 
the Supreme Court has been avowedly reluctant to condemn rules adopted by professional 
associations as unreasonable per se.189 Courts believe it would be inappropriate to apply a per se 
rule.190  This decision was not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of 
arrangement or the fact the organization may be a nonprofit entity.191 Rather, what is critical is 
that the cases involve industries in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all.192
 
  
Quick Look. Courts have adopted an intermediate rule of reason analysis commonly known as 
quick look or truncated analysis when a naked, effective restraint has an anticompetitive effect 
on the price, volume, or output market.193  The abbreviated rule of reason is an intermediate 
standard.194  It is applied in cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate, but where no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an 
inherently suspect restraint.195
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  Because competitive harm is presumed, the defendant must 
promulgate some competitive justification for the restraint, even in the absence of detailed 
market analysis indicating actual profit maximization or increased costs to the consumer 
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resulting from the restraint.196  If no legitimate justifications are set forth, the presumption of 
adverse competitive impact prevails and the court condemns the practice without further 
review.197  If the defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, however, the court must 
proceed to weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full scale rule of reason 
analysis.198  The quick look analysis is preferable to per se treatment because it approximates 
real world consumer conditions and provides flexibility for courts to consider the defendant’s 
proffered justifications.199
 
   
Rule of Reason.  Most restraints are analyzed under the traditional rule of reason.200  The rule of 
reason requires the fact finder to weigh all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.201  
The plaintiff bears an initial burden under the rule of reason of showing that the alleged 
combination or agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant product 
and geographic markets.202  The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of 
actual anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of output203
                                                          
196 Id. at 110.  
, increase in price, or deterioration in 
197 Chicago Prof’l Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Association, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992). 
198 Brown, 5 F. 3d at 669. 
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202 Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F. 2d 715, 722 (3rd Cir 1991). 
203 FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447, 460-61 (1986).  
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quality of goods or services.204  Such proof is often impossible to make, however, due to the 
difficulty of isolating the market effects of challenged conduct.205  Accordingly, courts typically 
allow proof of the defendant’s market power instead.206 Market power is the ability to raise 
prices above those that would prevail in a competitive market and is essentially a surrogate for 
detrimental effects.207
If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or 
actual anticompetitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged 
conduct promotes a sufficient procompetitive objective.
   
208  A restraint on competition cannot be 
justified solely on the basis of social welfare concerns.209   To rebut, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.210
Analysis under the rule of reason does not consider directly whether the challenged 
restraint is reasonable in the sense of being rationally related to a legitimate purpose.
  
211  That 
would be a constitutional claim.  The antitrust inquiry is whether the restraint is anticompetitive 
in light of its surrounding circumstances.212
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is not wholly immaterial.213  Analysis of the effect on competition entails examination of, among 
other things, circumstances peculiar to the business or industry and the reason for the restraint.214  
Whereas in some cases, a defendant claims to have acted with a procompetitive purpose, the 
challenged restraint must bear some nexus to that purpose for the claim to be credible.215
Anticompetitive Effects.  When articulating the anticompetitive effect of a regulation, a party 
must establish the relevant market (product/service and geographic), whether reasonable 
alternatives exist, and the basis for the restraint on the market.
 
216  In any rule of reason case, the 
threshold issue is market power, which is the ability to raise prices above competitive level by 
restricting output.217  As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a 
naked restriction on price or output.218  To the contrary, when there is an agreement not to 
compete in terms of price or output, no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement.219  The court has never required proof of market 
power in such a case.220  This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive 
justifications even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.221
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description.222  The geographic market extends to the area of effective competition where buyers 
can turn for alternative sources of supply.223  The product market includes the pool of goods or 
services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand.224  
Reasonable interchangeability may be gauged by (1) the product uses (whether reasonable 
substitutes exist), or (2) consumer response to changes in price level (cross-elasticity).225  Failure 
to identify a relevant market is a proper ground for dismissing a Sherman Act claim.226
If the plaintiff establishes a relevant market, the defendant will likely argue there are 
sufficient alternative markets.
   
227  Precedent indicates that exemptions to the market can be made 
when there are relevant differences that distinguish the proffered market.228  After establishing a 
market without reasonable alternatives, the plaintiff will be required to show the anticompetitive 
effect of the alleged restraint.229
Once the plaintiff has established an anticompetitive effect on trade or commerce, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant to establish procompetitive justifications for the alleged 
restraint.
     
230
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restrictive alternative.231  The plaintiff will bear the burden of proving that a viable less 
restrictive alternative exists.232
 
   
 
 
Section Two Claim 
To allege a claim for actual monopolization under Section Two of the Sherman Act, a 
plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant possess monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) 
the defendant willfully acquired or maintained its monopoly through exclusionary conduct; and 
(3) the defendant caused antitrust injury.233  Monopoly power consists of the power to control 
prices or exclude competition.234  After showing that a party possesses monopoly power in the 
relevant market, the plaintiff must show that the party has willfully acquired or maintained its 
monopoly power.235 In the case of an attempted monopolization the plaintiff must prove a 
specific intent to accomplish the forbidden objective; in the case of an actual monopolization, 
evidence of intent is merely relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly 
characterized as exclusionary, anticompetitive, or predatory.236
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does not violate Section Two by refusing to deal with a competitor if there are valid business 
reasons for the refusal.237
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
 The following chapter will present a discussion of the research that was presented in 
Chapter 4 and apply the results to the NCAA.  This application will lead to a determination of 
whether the NCAA would likely be granted an exemption from antitrust laws.  The chapter will 
conclude with possible recommendations for future research and a final conclusion of the study.   
 
NCAA Protection as Non-Profit Association  
 The NCAA is a non-profit association, and the first challenge the NCAA will present is 
that the Sherman Act does not apply to them because of their status.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
after courts’ initial reluctance to apply antitrust laws to non-profit associations, they have begun 
to apply the laws to associations that perform commercial activities.  The District Court in Board 
of Regents found that the NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize 
revenues; it is unclear why the NCAA argues that it is less likely to restrict output in order to 
raise revenues above those that could be realized in a competitive market than would be a for-
profit entity.238  If that was not clear enough, the Court went on to say that Section One applies 
to non-profit associations, including institutions of higher learning.239
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with the other cases that have applied antitrust laws to the NCAA should serve as a strong 
enough precedent for any case against the NCAA to move forward with an antitrust analysis.    
 
Section One Claim 
In order to establish a claim under Section One, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that there 
was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade 
under either a per se test or a rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate 
commerce.240
 
   
Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy.  The NCAA could become involved in multiple types 
of agreements that could affect their antitrust status.  The first way is through express 
agreements.  The NCAA’s largest express agreement is their contract with CBS and its partners 
to broadcast the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament.  The NCAA is involved in numerous 
other express agreements that could be challenged and would be easily identifiable in court.  It is 
fairly well settled that express agreement with entities outside the NCAA should not be granted 
an exemption from antitrust laws simply because a non-profit association is involved in the 
agreement.  This safeguard is reasonable to prevent the NCAA from being able to secure 
business deals that other entities would not be able to make because they were for-profit entities.    
The more interesting, and newly relevant, form of agreement that may affect the NCAA would 
be an agreement within a single entity.   
 For the purpose of the NCAA regulating its member institutions, the possibility of being 
a single entity would remove the Association from antitrust consideration.  A violation of 
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Section One requires a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more actors.  If the 
member institutions that form the NCAA are considered a single entity, they cannot form a 
contract, conspiracy, or combination in violation of Section One.  Teams within a sport league 
have been held to be more like a single entity than a multiplicity of actors.241  The First Circuit 
went the other direction by rejecting single entity status for sports leagues.242  However, there is 
a case being argued in front of the Supreme Court involving the Copperweld doctrine’s 
applicability to the National Football League.243  The NCAA submitted an amicus curiae brief in 
the case and argued that the Court should recognize sport leagues as single entities when they 
promulgate or enforce league rules that do not eliminate actual or potential economic 
competition between league members.244
 
  Such recognition would grant the NCAA almost 
unlimited freedom to regulate its members.  The recognition as a single entity for promulgating 
league rules makes sense and should be upheld.  This decision would not provide a blanket 
exemption for the NCAA from antitrust regulation, but would provide an exemption when the 
NCAA is only legislating rules that regulate its members.   
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade.  The second element of a Section One claim involves 
showing that the alleged restraint of trade is unreasonable.  There are three different tests that can 
be used to determine if a restraint is unreasonable: per se, rule of reason, and quick look rule of 
reason.  The NCAA presents a unique problem for assessing the reasonableness of a restraint of 
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trade due to the structure of the entity.  When the NCAA regulates its members’ actions, they are 
creating a classic horizontal restraint on trade that is often held unreasonable as a matter of law.  
A horizontal restraint of trade is an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will 
compete with one another.245  The NCAA clearly implements horizontal restraints that would 
give rise to a review using the per se test because they are direct affronts to competition.  
However, if the NCAA is to be of any value at all to its members, it must regulate how they 
interact with each other.  Furthermore, courts have recognized that these restraints are necessary 
for an association to operate and have moved the review from the per se test to a rule of reason 
analysis to take other factors into consideration of the reasonableness of the restraints.246
There are three main steps to an antitrust challenge using a rule of reason analysis: (1) the 
plaintiff must establish that the agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the 
relevant product market; (2) the defendant then argues that the adverse, anticompetitive effects 
are outweighed by the procompetitive objective; and (3) whether there is a less restrictive 
alternative.
        
247
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  NCAA cases have usually not faced much opposition proving the first element of 
the test.  Most agreements challenged against the NCAA are straightforward horizontal restraints 
that would be deemed illegal under a per se test, but they are being reviewed using rule of reason 
analysis because of the NCAA’s unique structure.  Because they are generally straightforward 
horizontal restraints, proving that the agreements produced adverse, anticompetitive effects is 
usually fairly easy.  Some NCAA challengers may run into problems identifying the relevant 
market, as seen in Tanaka.  However, in Tanaka, the plaintiff attempted to argue an extremely 
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limited product market in that case and most other NCAA cases have not had issues proving the 
impact on a market that is national in scope.  Additionally, while the NCAA benefits in some 
respects from its unique structure, it may be hurt in arguing the relevant product market.  If the 
NCAA is as unique as it claims, professional sports cannot be argued as a reasonable alternative 
market.  This limits the product market to amateur, collegiate athletics.  This narrow market 
makes it easy for the plaintiff to establish that the product market has been illegally restrained.           
 The real fireworks in an antitrust challenge against the NCAA will come with the 
Association arguing that the procompetitive objective outweighs any adverse, anticompetitive 
effects.  A plaintiff should be able to establish all parts of a proper challenge up to this point, so 
the case will be determined on whether the court will accept the NCAA’s rationale for 
establishing the challenged policies as justifiable for the adverse impact that they have on the 
plaintiff.  The NCAA has been involved in numerous antitrust cases as discussed throughout and 
has proffered justifications for restraints such as protection of live attendance248, maintaining 
competitive balance249, and, primarily, preserving amateurism.250  While justifications that can 
be linked to commercial ideals, such as live attendance, have not been accepted as 
procompetitive reasons for restraint, other proffered reasons such as amateurism have been 
accepted by courts.251  This dichotomy between commercialism and amateurism is where an 
exemption from antitrust laws for the NCAA should be created, if it has not already been 
done.252
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 The court in Justice was one of the first to expressly state the difference between the 
NCAA regulating to protect amateurism and the NCAA taking action with an economic 
purpose.253  The Court stated that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking 
activity.254  One type, exemplified by the rules in Hennessey and Jones, is rooted in the NCAA’s 
concern for the protection of amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a 
discernible economic purpose.255  In that case, the Court found that the NCAA giving an 
institution a penalty was reasonably related to the NCAA’s central objective, and was not 
overbroad.256  Therefore, the action was not an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act.257
 The recognition of the dichotomy in Justice was important for the NCAA, but the ruling 
in Gaines may have been even more important.  In Gaines, the Court stated that the NCAA is 
engaged in a business venture and is not entitled to a total exemption from antitrust regulation on 
the ground that its activities and objectives are educational and are carried on for the benefit of 
amateurism.
     
258  However, the Court granted a preliminary injunction to the NCAA on the 
grounds that the eligibility rules are not subject to the scrutiny of antitrust analysis under the 
Sherman Act.259
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  The Court clarified that by holding that eligibility rules are not subject to 
antitrust analysis, they were by no means creating a total exemption, but rather a very narrow 
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one.260
 Most antitrust analysis of NCAA rules will not make it to the final aspect of the test to 
examine if there is a less restrictive alternative.  If a case does make it this far, the outcome is 
hardly predictable.  The less restrictive alternative doctrine is difficult to predict because it is 
extremely vague.
  This view was originally argued in the dissent in Board of Regents, but this was the first 
majority opinion to expressly state that some NCAA rules were exempt from antitrust laws.       
261
 
  This vagueness provides the court with a great deal of flexibility to create a 
judgment that fits the facts of the case.  Such flexibility makes it impossible to speculate how a 
court would handle a challenge to the NCAA’s antitrust status because it would depend on the 
facts of each case and the matters challenged.         
Interstate Commerce. There are two parts to determining whether a restraint affects interstate 
commerce: (1) the challenged activity involves “trade or commerce”; and (2) the effect of the 
activity is “substantial” or not “insubstantial.”262  The few challenges that have arisen involving 
the trade or commerce part of this test have involved universities.  Courts have decided that the 
relevant inquiry is into the nature of the activity at issue rather than the status of the entity 
itself.263  While there may be a narrow exception for non-profit entities to the trade or commerce 
test, Brown explicitly stated that exchange of money for services, even by a nonprofit 
organization, is a quintessential commercial transaction.264
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is commerce in the most common usage of the word, including the payment of tuition in return 
for services.265
 The more frequent challenge involves the second element in determining whether a 
restraint has substantially affected trade or commerce.
   
266  Some courts only require a showing 
that the defendant’s general business activities in some way affect commerce267, while others 
only require a showing that the activity is likely to affect commerce.268  In addition, the 
necessary effect on interstate commerce must be substantial or at least not insubstantial.269  
However, this part of the antitrust analysis rarely stops a case from moving forward as it is not a 
rigorous test like identifying a market or weighing the effects of a restraint.270  This is mostly a 
jurisdictional element and the Supreme Court noted in McLain that an antitrust complaint should 
not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief.271
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Future Research Opportunities 
 The future research opportunities in this area will be greatly dependent upon the 
American Needle outcome and the current Sam Keller and Ed O’Bannon lawsuit.272  When 
American Needle is decided, it could provide the NCAA a huge relief from the Sherman Act if 
they rule that the NFL is a single entity.  If they rule in favor of American Needle and determine 
that the NFL is not a single entity, not much will change for the NCAA.  The real change in the 
landscape could come from the Sam Keller and Ed O’Bannon case.273
 
  In that case, former 
college football and basketball players are suing the NCAA and EA Sports for using their 
likeness for profit long after their college careers have ended without their consent.  The case has 
made it past preliminary rulings and is currently in the early discovery process.  It is noteworthy 
that the case even made it to discovery because very few cases of this nature advance this far.  
The discovery process should provide great insight into the NCAA and its financial operations 
that could lead to further research in this area.  If the case goes all the way to a judgment, an 
examination of the case could lead to multiple research projects and the impact it will have on 
college athletics.    
Conclusion 
 If a court is faced with analyzing an antitrust case involving the NCAA, the court must 
take a slightly different approach than it would with a normal antitrust case.  The first step in 
determining if there is a contract, combination, or conspiracy is similar to a regular case, but may 
change soon.  Depending on the outcome of the American Needle case, the NCAA could be 
treated significantly different as a single entity than other organizations.  Currently, after 
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determining that there is a contract, combination, or conspiracy, the court must establish that the 
restraint was unreasonable.  Most actions taken by the NCAA would fall under a per se test, but 
due to the NCAA’s unique organizational status, courts have determined that a rule of reason 
analysis is the appropriate standard.  Under the rule of reason analysis, the court must weigh the 
anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive effects of the challenged activity.  The NCAA 
will lean heavily on its preservation of amateurism as its procompetitive objective.  The 
amateurism ideal will often carry a significant amount of weight in court, but will not always 
defeat an antitrust challenge.  If the case makes it to the last portion of the test involving a 
significant impact on trade or commerce, the case will rarely get defeated.  This last hurdle is not 
very stringent and will rarely be grounds for dismissal of a case.         
  The NCAA presents a unique problem for courts examining its antitrust status.  The 
Association should not be granted a total exemption from antitrust laws because there are 
numerous highly commercial aspects of the NCAA.  A total exemption would grant the NCAA 
the freedom to carry out business arrangements that would be immediately struck down by the 
courts if they were carried out by normal businesses.  However, the NCAA requires a partial 
exemption from antitrust laws in order to operate as an effective organization.  The exemption 
the NCAA should be granted, although it appears that it is already in effect through the common 
law, should cover all aspects that preserve the amateur status of collegiate athletics.  This puts 
the court under some pressure as the dichotomy is not always a clear demarcation, but the courts 
have begun to establish precedent to guide their decisions as they move forward.  Rules dealing 
with eligibility, amateurism, transfers, most recruiting rules, and other similar concepts should be 
granted immunity from antitrust scrutiny.  However, television contracts, acquisitions, personnel 
salaries, and other commercial transactions should be monitored using current antitrust law.        
